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At the start of December, President Trump brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the core feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and conflict resolution—though how this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a high-ranking U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but analysts caution it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Neglect and Friction

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Conditional Action

A comparable confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.